Introduction
A number of European fighters, along with others coming from all corners of the globe, have been joining violent Islamist groups in Iraq and Syria; first and foremost, the so-called Islamic Law and Human Rights defines a foreign fighter as an "individual who leaves his or her country of origin or habitual residence to join a non state armed group in an armed conflict abroad and who is primarily motivated by ideology, religion and/or kinship" (Geneva Academy 2014, 6). However, new methods have increased the speed of radicalization and thus facilitated the whole process. For example, the central role of the Internet has seemingly brought about a remarkable change of scale (Carter, Maher and Neumann 2014: Saltman and Winter 2014) . The tragic events that took place in Paris in January and November 2015 shed even more light on a worrisome phenomenon: the return of these foreign fighters (Bakker and de Leede 2015) . Europol Director Rob Wainwright considers this to be the most serious terrorist threat faced by Europe since 9/11. 
The Phenomenon of Foreign Terrorist Fighters: New Trends and Challenges
The expansion of Daesh has been impressive. The group can be considered as a salafi jihadist and extremist movement (Bunzel 2015) which, from its perspective, fights for Sunni Muslims suffering from several injustices. 5 It has become one of the most violent terrorist groups in a very short amount of time. In November 2014, 664 violent Islamist attacks had been reported in 14 countries with a total amount of 5042 deaths (Neumann 2014 (Johnston & al. 2016) . It can be observed most clearly in Raqqa, the new capital city of the Islamic State, where there is a police force, taxation and application of Sharia Law through courts.
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Daesh has acted as a magnet for candidates to jihad (Bakker and de Leede 2015) . The United Nations speak of 30,000 foreign fighters coming from more than 100 countries with 3,000
Europeans amongst them. 9 Contrary to the widespread assumption that the recruitment of foreign fighters is a new problem, the phenomenon has as a matter of fact emerged in numerous civil conflicts from the Spanish Civil War, the Afghan struggle against the Soviets, the Bosnian conflict in the 1990's, and the Chechnya armed conflicts, to name a few (Hegghammer 2010) .
The notion of jihad in Islam is a multi-faceted concept with different interpretations over time (Bonner 2006) . Though it recovers the idea of spiritual effort against one's ego, it has been reduced lately to its martial aspect. In the early times of Islam, jihad referred to a codified set of rules on how to conduct warfare. Nowadays, the notion of jihad is unfairly often reduced to naming violent political action from radical Islamist groups. and the openness of the process online compared with the more underground aspect of past jihadi waves.
A Diversity of Profiles: Youth and Women
French authorities Female recruits who join IS occupy a range of non-military functions especially connected to recruitment and the more long-term,state-building mission (Hoyle, Bradford and Frenett 2014 (Carter, Maher and Neumann 2014 ).
Twitter is a major tool for disseminators (Klausen 2015 culture are used in the process, in order to normalize the status of these fighters and thus attract even more potential candidates, as the tech-savvy generation is the main target of Daesh (Atwan 2015, 20) .
The role of the Internet and the exploitation of tools used by everyone should not, however, lead to an overestimation of what remains essentially a tool (Ghaffar and Salman 2014, 17).
The social aspect of radicalization is crucial, as most of the time, it involves groups of young people embarking on the radical track together, with peer pressure playing a large role in the process (Neumann 2014: Bakker and de Leede 2015, 35) . Erin Saltman insists that the first point of contact for radicalization remains offline; the Internet mainly serves to "indoctrinate, educate, and socialize". 
A Complex Security Threat
Two developing dynamics characterizing the recent jihadi wave to join Daesh have been exposed: the diversity of profiles and the multidimensional role of the Internet. These dynamics call for an adaptation in the fight against terrorism and this particular phenomenon as these three trends increase uncertainty and make prevention and the identification of potential candidates more complex. Before turning to the position of Islamic institutions on this issue, it is necessary to quickly reassess the reaction of the European governments at large. This is a prerequisite before trying to answer the question of whether institutional Islam is involved in this reaction.
One of the biggest threats concerns the "returnees" and the fact that when the fighters come back to Europe, they bring along with them special training, fighting techniques, and contacts within the "international jihadist sphere". Despite the importance of the FTF on security agendas of European governments, Muslim organizations tend to focus on domestic issues and ignore international issues. There are few press releases concerning Syria, Iraq and Foreign Fighters in light of the numerous events affecting the region. Three poles are focused on by the organization:
France

The official body representing Islam in France is the French Council of the Muslim Cult (CFCM). Council action is mostly prominent in issues related
• domestic security issues, especially the Charlie Hebdo attacks and the crisis management that ensued,
• institutional issues, notably the inscription of the UOIF on the list of terrorist groups by the United Arab Emirates, and
• foreign policy issues with a bias in favor of Palestine, with some occasional references to other conflicts (Nigeria, Pakistan…).
As to Daesh, UOIF regards the group as a "sect", not a "religious phenomenon". 26 In a call to all Muslims in France, it is stated that the group is neither a state nor Islamic. 27 It is interesting to note that UOIF constantly uses the term Daesh rather than ISIS. Before that, it used the expression "the group that calls itself the Islamic State", a paraphrase to indicate that both the terms Islamic and State are abused.
UOIF has issued a series of press releases to condemn the various crimes committed by the group, such as the assassination of foreign hostages 28 or the destruction of cultural sites. 29 In a press release reporting the destruction of works of art by Daesh, the comparison is made with the destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan.
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The condemnation of executions is often made with theological references related to the sanctity of human life in Islam. In a press release condemning the execution of Peter Kassig, UOIF notes that "the life of a human being in Islam is sacred and cannot be the object of such a crime". 31 Religion in this perspective is perceived as being instrumentalized: UOIF considers that "All these executions in the name of Islam are only an instrumentalization of the Muslim religion by terrorist groups".
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The major concern of UOIF is to distance itself and Islam as a religion from the ideology and 
Great Britain
The Muslim Council of Britain is an umbrella organization created in 1997 and aspiring to be the voice of Muslims in the country (Pêdziwiatr 2007, 45; Archer 2009, 336) . Presented as the "first democratic British Muslim organization", the MCB counts more than 500 affiliated organizations and claims to challenge extremist groups. 44 The Council advocates participation and engagement in the political process with aims of influencing policies (Pêdziwiatr 2007, 46) . Conceived from the beginning as an organization close to the government, the MCB consulted on various occasions with the government, especially after the 9/11 attacks, to discuss various issues such as the media coverage, the protection of Muslims, and foreign policy (Birt 2005, 94 In its FAQ section of the website, the MCB is presented as an independent "national representative Muslim umbrella body with over 500 affiliated national, regional and local organisations, mosques, charities and schools. The MCB is pledged to work for the common good of society as a whole; encouraging individual Muslims and Muslim organisations to play a full and participatory role in public life. »
The action of the MCB is also focused on the domestic level and the fight against discrimination and Islamophobia. Regarding Daesh, two categories of action stand out:
• detaching its actions from the Islamic faith, and
• promoting the creation of a counter-propaganda against Daesh.
The MCB's resonance of its discourse in the media is much stronger than its French counterpart. 45 The MCB holds a discourse similar to the UOIF's when condemning the executions by Daesh. Once again, the idea that the acts committed by Daesh in the name of
Islam violate the principles of this religion is recurrent, for example in the following quote:
"These extremists in Iraq and Syria claim to be acting in the name of Islam. But there is nothing in our faith that condones such behavior. Muslims in Britain and around the world have condemned these people, and the arguments they use have been refuted comprehensively as being far from the religion of Islam". 46 In another press release, the MCB notes that "ISIS does not speak for Islam, and has been repudiated by all Muslims". 47 The MCB notes that "Muslims abhor the way ISIS has dishonored Islam's teachings of peace and tolerance". 48 Where UOIF would simply state that Daesh has nothing to do it with Islam, the MCB goes further by accusing the media of perpetuating the confusion: therefore, the MCB invites media to differentiate the group from the Islamic faith in general, in order to avoid any misperceptions. 49 The MCB urged "the media in refraining from giving them any further undue exposure beyond conventional reporting". 50 The condemnation of hostage assassinations has been particularly strong, with an emphasis on the sanctity of life in Islam. 51 Similarly to the UOIF, the MCB occasionally uses theological arguments. When calling for the release of Alan Henning, a British hostage, the MCB posted on its website "a translation of a Covenant reported to have been made to Christians by the Prophet Muhammad, upon whom be peace. We hope it is a reminder to all of the obligations Muslims have in respecting and upholding the rights of people of other faiths".
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Whereas the documents of the UOIF did not explicitly contain a political position on the situation of Syria, the MCB has warned about the risks related to a military intervention for the civilian population, while calling for the British Parliament to find a political solution to the conflict.
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Regarding more specifically the issue of foreign fighters, the debates have centered on new counter-terrorist legislation heavily criticized by the MCB. Reflecting the securitization of
Islam that has been going on since the September 11 attacks, the MCB criticized the bill for its ineffectiveness, the lack of inclusion of the Muslim community in the creation of the bill, its discriminatory practices (stop and search), and general alienation of Muslims.
The mobilization of the MCB seems more grounded in political action than the UOIF's, being mostly limited to the humanitarian aspect, through demonstrations, aid to refugees and prayers. The MCB thus gives specific prescriptions on foreign fighters, including the need to tackle hate speech, the need to build a counter-narrative to Daesh's propaganda by mobilizing for example returnees, and the need to be more flexible with them: this means "treating each case on its own merit" to identify the voices that can be used "against further recruitment" as stated by Talha Ahmad.
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Contrary to the French context where the UOIF is not engaged in a partnership with state authorities, the MCB claims its status of stakeholder in debates regarding counter-terrorist legislation. The MCB perceives the government's Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill as a threat to community cohesion. In a press release calling for the Parliament to vote against the project, the MCB notes that "Whether it is in mosques, education or charities, the perception is that all aspects of Muslim life must undergo a 'Prevent compliance' test to prove our loyalty to this country. The proposed Bill will add to this climate of fear and victimization within the Muslim community, further weakening trust with public authorities". 
Conclusion
This analysis has emphasized the most significant evolving dynamics of the Foreign Terrorist
Fighters phenomenon. These dynamics naturally force governments to think differently about strategies to counter radicalization and terrorism, but the focus of this study was on a specific actor: selected Islamic organizations in France and Great Britain.
Though no generalization can be made over the position of Muslims in France and Great
Britain on the issue of Daesh and its attraction of Foreign Terrorist Fighters, it is still
revealing to look at the position of respective organizations in each country to highlight specific trends. In this regard, the priority for the two organizations is to avoid any confusion regarding Daesh and the Muslim communities at large. There is a strong emphasis to delegitimize the religious nature claimed by the group. As to the policymaking regarding security issues, the MCB is confronting the government, a trend which is not specific to the events triggered by Daesh, but which can be identified since the 9/11 attacks and the securitization of Islam-related issues that ensued. As the French centralized and assimilationist model is not favorable to partnerships with religious groups, there are no surprises there as well: the UOIF invests its efforts in delegitimizing Daesh, but is more discreet on the counterterrorist policies and deradicalization. When reading the press resleases and reports between June 2015 and November 2016, these trends seem to continue though the issue of returnees becomes more acute with the increasing military pressures on the Islamic State and their apparent deteriorating situation as attested by the decrease of their propaganda (Milton 2016 
